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Abstract
The semiconductor industry is an exciting and challenging industry. Strong demand
at the application end, plus the high capital intensity and rapid technological in-
novation in manufacturing, makes it difficult to manage supply chain planning and
investment in technology transitions. Better understanding the essence of the indus-
try dynamics will help firms win competitive advantages in this turbulent market.
In this thesis, we will study semiconductor industry dynamics from three different
angles: quantitative modeling, industry dynamics simulation, and strategic analysis.
First, we develop a stochastic linear optimization model to address the supplier's
"order fulfillment dilemma" suggested by previous empirical studies. The model pro-
vides optimal equipment production decisions that minimize the total cost under
stochastic demand. To solve the large scale problem, we introduce the Bender's De-
composition, which is proven to outperform the pure Simplex method. Furthermore,
we extend the basic model to multiple periods, allowing equipment inventory planning
over a period of time.
Second, we build a macro-level industry dynamic model using the methodology of
System Dynamics. The model includes components of electronics demand projection,
fabrication capacity allocation, fabrication cost structure, technology roadmaping as
well as equipment production and R&D. The model generates projections of demand
, industry productivity, schedule of building new fabrication, adoption of the latest
process technology, etc., which are validated by actual industry data. In addition,
we devise a control panel in the software that enables the users to implement flexible
scenario and sensitivity analysis.
Third, we propose a strategic framework for companies to pinpoint the root causes
of the supply-demand mismatch problem. This framwork considers long lead times,
fast clockspeeds, Moore's Law, and risky product and technology, which transitions
contribute to the pronounced volatility amplification occurring in the semiconduc-
tor industry. This framework, along with several industry successful practices, will
assist companies to mitigate the demand volatility and improve their supply chain
performance.
Thesis Supervisor: Charles H. Fine
Title: Chrysler LFM Professor of Management
MIT Sloan School of Management
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The semiconductor industry value chain has three key components: electronics com-
panies, IC manufacturers (chip companies) and equipment suppliers. The following
chart outlines the basic structure of, and the material flow in this supply chain.
Figure 1-1: Structure of the semiconductor industry
Each of the members procures materials necessary for its production from its
upstream suppliers, and delivers products and services to its downstream clients.
1.1 Electronics Companies
The electronics company acquires chips that are supplied by IC manufacturers and
integrates them into systems and devices used for application purposes. Electronic
products are everywhere, particularly in communication, entertainment and house-
hold or office appliances. Products that fall into these categories include telephones,
personal computers, audio or video equipment and televisions. In fact, the global
consumer electronics market is growing at an unprecedented speed: the worldwide
sales of consumer electronics exceeded 506 billion $ in 2007 with an annual growth
rate of 12.7 % during the past five years [41]. Electronics companies, such as IBM,
Apple, Samsung, Dell, Hewlett-Packard and Sony, are market leaders with renowned
brand names.
1.2 Chip Manufacturers
Figure 1-2 shows that the manufacturing of semiconductor chips includes three major
steps: design, fabrication and assembly [36] .
Figure 1-2: Chip manufacturing process
Design: In the design stage, engineers translate the functionality of devices into
the layout of a circuit board that consists of hundreds of millions of transistors,
connected with wires on a nanometer scale. The chip design is implemented in a
standardized procedure so that chips can be manufactured reliably.
Fabrication: When the design is complete, chips are put into mass production
in the manufacturing facility called Wafer fab, where tools and equipment process
circular silicon wafers of 200 or 300 mm in diameter. Each wafer yields hundreds of
chips through up to six hundred repetitive steps, including printing the designed lay-
out on the wafer by lithography tools, creating electrical conductivity by implanting
the wafer with ions, and depositing various chemicals on the wafer by etching.
Assembly: In the last stage, finished wafers are cut into individual chips. After
a series of testing procedures, the surviving chips are packaged and assembled on a
board, waiting for shipment.
Implementing the above wafer fab model, Intel, Samsung and Texas Instruments
have became the top three chip manufacturers worldwide. However, ten years ago,
some middle and small chip companies suffered from declining profitability, which
drove them to start outsourcing their production to other manufacturers. As a result
of this trend, on one hand, many chip companies no longer owned and operated fabs,
and concentrated their limited capital on the design stage to capture the value of the
emerging technology. These companies, such as Qualcomm and Nvidia, are known as
fabless firms. They are exhibiting an aggressive expansion rate of 23 percent annually
[35]. On the other hand, some chip manufacturers began to focus on producing chips
for other brands, as opposed to selling their own products. These companies are
called "pure" foundry firms, serving as the contract manufacturers of fabless firms.
For example, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) was the
first foundry firm and is currently the largest in the world.
IDMIASIC IDMIASIC . IDMIASIC Fabless Co. System Co.
Fabless Co.
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Figure 1-3: Structural change of the chip industry supply chain, source: TSMC
The rising trend of the fabless and foundry firms has reflected the structural
change of the IC manufacturing supply chain in the past twenty years: from vertically-
integrated models to multi-level decentralized structures. This pattern is common in
many industries [353.
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1.3 Equipment Suppliers
The equipment supplier plays a critical role in facilitating the chip manufacturer by
delivering process-compatible tools . Figure 1-4 shows all categories of fab equipment
as well as their percentage share of capital spending.
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Figure 1-4: Equipment category and captial spending, source: IC Knowledge
However, two factors have made the fab equipment a challenging but risky business
for both chip manufacturers and equipment suppliers:
Capital Requirement. Chip companies spend the most of capital on building
wafer fabs (see Fig 1-4), in which equipment procurement accounts for the largest
segment of the cost structure. For instance, the industry leader, Intel Corporation,
spends more than five billion dollars in buying equipment every year [7] . Among
all types of equipment, the lithography, deposition, and etching tools amount 
to
the highest capital expenditure (see Fig 1-4). A single item of these tools will cost
millions of dollars for chip companies. Given such magnitude of capital intensity, 
chip
companies are very cautious about making equipment procurement decisions.
Uncertain Market: Historically the semiconductor market has exhibited 
a high
degree of volatility. Electronics companies are constantly updating old 
and intro-
ducing new products. In addition, due to the rapid technology transition 
in chip
manufacturing, the life cycle of each chip generation is short, which 
in turn short-
ens the lives of wafer fabs and equipment. As a result, equipment suppliers 
have to
regularly adjust the equipment standards and calibrations, catering to the emerging
r, 01-U1h h
generation of wafer fabs.
The focus of this thesis is on the interaction among the three supply chain members
on the operational and strategic level. In Chapter 2, a stochastic linear optimization
model will be introduced to analyze and optimize an order fulfilling dilemma encoun-
tered by equipment suppliers. In Chapter 3, a macro-level industry dynamics model
that encompasses the electronics demand, semiconductor fab capacity allocation as
well as the equipment production and R&D will be presented. The last Chapter will
discuss qualitatively the causes of the supply-demand mismatch problem happening
profoundly in the semiconductor industry and propose several strategic scenarios to
counter the problem.

Chapter 2
Quantifying the Equipment
Supplier's Dilemma
Semiconductor equipment suppliers suffer from demand uncertainty. They face an
order-fulfillment dilemma: either starting production early, bearing the risk of the
demand not materializing, or starting late, facing the cost of rush orders and delayed
delivery. There have been some empirical studies on this issue, but few quantita-
tive analyses has addressed this problem. In this Chapter, we develop a stochastic
linear optimization model, to quantify the supplier's dilemma and provide optimal
production decisions that minimize the total cost. In addition, we introduce Bender's
Decomposition to solve the large scale problem, which is proven to outperform the
pure Simplex method. Furthermore, we extend our basic model to a multiple pe-
riod planning model, allowing equipment inventory planning over a period of time.
Through the study of models and case examples, we have drawn insights on both
computational and managerial levels.
2.1 Background
As illstruated in Chapter 1, semiconductor equipment suppliers are subject to high
capital intensitiy and demand uncertainty. The turbulent market environment leads
the equipment supplier to face an order-fulfillment dilemma [7]: on one hand, the
demand uncertainty forces the supplier to shorten the order delivery cycle because
the customers demand a high degree of responsiveness; on the other hand, since fab
equipment is a customized business, it is very costly and risky to keep any finished
inventory before signing the contracts. Under these circumstances, the supplier can
start production early, but has to bear the cost if the demand is not fully material-
ized. Alternatively, the supplier can delay the production until the actual demand
information becomes available, thereby facing the rush order costs or late delivery
penalties. This dilemma is described as "early and be wrong or wait and be late"
[40].
In the context of the semiconductor industry, Cohen et al. fulfilled an empirical
study that addressed to the supplier dilemma. They drew conclusion that the cost
of overproduction in the early stage is two to three times higher than the cost of
rush-off and delay penalty. Therefore, suppliers behave conservatively in production
planning. In this Chapter, we will provide modeling-based analysis to capture the
production planning decision of, as well as the "dilemma" encountered by the semicon-
ductor equipment supplier. In the presence of the demand uncertainty, a stochastic
optimization model, specifically the two-stage method, will be used to approach the
problem.
2.2 Description of Problem
Equipment suppliers sell different types of tools that meet the demand for building
new wafer fabs. Due to the demand certainty, the demand for a new wafer fab
is stochastic. In this study, the demand for each type of wafer fab is modeled as
a normally distributed random variable (pt, a are given). These random variables
/-
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Figure 2-1: Problem setting
are mutually independent. To approximate the real distribution, we discretize the
probability density function (PDF) of a given normal distribution.
The equipment supplier will make production decisions in two stages: early pro-
duction to meet part of the demand and secure in-time delivery; second stage pro-
duction when the actual demand is realized.
Notation
* i: The number of equipment types being sold by equipment suppliers
* j: The number of wafer fab types constructed by chip companies
* w: The number of different scenarios given the scholastic demand data
* pr,: The probability that scenario w happens
* Dj,: Demand for Fab j under scenario w
* Hij: The amount of equipment i needed to build a fab j
* DEi,: Demand for equipment i under demand scenario w, DEiw = Hij x Djw
* cli: The cost of producing equipment i in stage one, million $/item
* c2i: The cost of producing equipment i in stage two, million $/item
* c3i: The cost of "early and be wrong" per equipment i, million $/item
* Capai: The capacity of equipment i production
21
Scenarios Let ni be the number of discrete points that approximate the distri-
bution of the demand for fab i. Then the total number of scenarios is:
I
W ni
i= 1
Decision Variables
* xi: The amount of equipment i produced in stage 1
* yi,: The amount of equipment i produced in stage 2, under demand scenario w
Assumption 2.2.1. Demand has to be satisfied, no backlog can be made.
Assumption 2.2.2. The "wait and be late" cost per equipment in the second stage
is much higher than the regular production in the first stage. The cost of "early and
be wrong" is the highest [7].
C3i > C2i > Cli
The Model
I W I I
min E clii + ZprW( c2iYi. + c3&(xi + Yiw - DEI.))
i=1 w=1 i=l i=1
s.t xi < Capai
xi + Yiw > DEiw
Yiw, Capa2
Xi, Yiw >0 (2.1)
The 1st and 3rd constraint are capacity constraints . The 2nd is demand con-
straint. (2.1) is modeled using a two stages stochastic linear programming method.
2.3 A Case Example
To illustrate the model, we introduce a basic example: a equipment supplier sells four
types of equipment (A, B, C, D), catering to the demand for two types of fabs (1, 2):
fab 1 requires equipment A, B and C; fab 2 requires equipment B, C and D.
D1 Fab 1 Fab 2 D2i~"Z Ct~i ~t (n,\XI\
Equipment A Equipment 8 Equipment C Equipment D
Figure 2-2: Example
The demand for two types of fabs follows normal distribution whose mean and
standard deviation is given the following table.
Table 2.1: Demand Distribution
Variable Mean Std
D1 17 4
D2 25 3
For simplicity, we use five-point approximation to discretize the above two distri-
butions.
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Figure 2-3: Demand Distribution
Table 2.2 shows the other parameters used in (2.1).
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Table 2.2: Model Parameters
Equipment H~1
A 3
B 4
C 2
C 0
Hi2
0
2
3
1
Ci
1
2
2.5
1.5L='
C2i
2
4
5
3
C3i
2.5
4.5
5.5
3.5
Capacity
200
200
200
200
In this basic case, the model includes 25 scenarios, 4 stage one variables, 100 stage
two variables, 108 constraints. It is coded using both OPL and AMPL. The optimal
production decision is shown in Fig 2-4: the blue bar is the volume of stage-one
production; the green bar is the average volume of stage-two production; gray line
marks the expectation (mean) of demand.
I -Stw 2
Equipment
Figure 2-4: Basic Case Result
Note that though most of expected demand are fulfilled in stage one, the stochastic
nature forces the company to delay certain amount of production in stage two in order
to hedge againt the uncertainty.
'"'
I
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2.3.1 Uncertainty vs. Optimum
High demand volatility will discourage the equipment company from carrying out
large early production, because the cost of holding excessive inventory will be much
higher than the cost of "wait and see". Therefore, the company, to some extent, tends
to wait and start production late. To illustrate this, we simulate different degrees of
demand uncertainty by adjusting the standard deviation, and compare the optimal
solution.
E
Equipment
Figure 2-5: Solutions under different demand uncertainty Low uncertainty =1, median
uncertainty=2, high uncertainty=3
Figure 2-5 shows that the higher level of uncertainty, the less volume produced
in the early stage, and the more to be delayed to the late stage. Thus, demand
uncertainty not only hurts the supplier by imposing more extra cost, but also leads
to late delivery of equipment,slow ramp-up and capacity underutilization [7]. As a
result, chip companies suffer a significant loss from unmet demand, which undermines
the overall efficiency of the whole supply chain. This suggests that both companies
will benefit from better supply chain coordination to tackle the uncertainty. Section
2.6 will discuss several possible countering strategies.
2.3.2 Numerical Analysis
In reality, the equipment company has to deal with a much larger problem scale. As
illustrated in section 2.2, the total number of scenarios w = fzi=1 ni is the function
of the number of fabs and the discretization of demand distribution, which directly
affecys the scale of the problem. We can apply more accurate approximation of
demand using finer discretization (see Fig 2-6 ), but the size of the stage two problem
will go exponentially large.
31.j I--~----
Figure 2-6: Discretization of the demand distribution
Table 2.3: Numerical Result (fix discretization, vary the # of fabs)
of fabs variables of constraints Solving Memory Solving time(s)
2 328 652 150021 0.03
3 2921 5837 4887384 2.63
4 26249 52493 42399640 246.56
5 236201 472397 371987972 16982.22
6 2125769 4251533
3
j . 1
lyti lilt
J4I 1 4U , L y4I.
.11 hI
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Table 2.4: Numerical Result (fix the # of fabs, vary discretization )
Discretization variables constraints Solving Memory Solving time(s)
5 505 1005 947640 0.19
9 2921 5837 4905080 1.92
13 8793 17581 14131824 17.17
17 19657 39309 31067528 95.67
21 37049 74093 58249900 373.69
25 62505 125005 96068116 835.47
29 97561 195117 140328204 1456.84
As shown in Table 2.3 and 2.4 The problem scale goes up exponentially with
respect to the number of fabs when fixing the demand discretization fineness; given
the number of fabs, the scale increases quadratically with the number of points used
in discretization. In order to choose a proper fineness, we have to weigh the trade-
off between computation efficiency and model accuracy. When billions of dollars of
investment are at stake, it typically pays to achieve a high level of accuracy.
2.4 Bender's Decomposition
The disadvantage of model (2.1) is that it can easily become very large. The lin-
ear programming solver, however, doesn't demonstrate sufficient power to solve the
large-scale problems. The Bender's Decomposition approach is widely used to solve
large scale optimization problems by dividing the original problem into a number of
subproblems that can be solved efficiently. The two-stage model (2.1) can be directly
transformed into the standard form of the Bender's Decomposition as follows:
I I I W I
min (cii + c3i)xj + Z(c21 + C31)prlYil + C2w C3w)PrwYiw - S E c3iwprDE
i=1 i=1 i=1 i=w i=1
s.t xi < Capai
zi + Yii 2 DEi
Yii < Capai
xi + Yiw _ DEi,
Yiw Capa,
Xi, yil, Yi2, ...Yi~w > 0 (2.2)
To decompose the coupling constraints, we reformulate the problem into a master
and a group of subproblems. The format of the subproblem is stated as follows:
I I
Sub: z,(±) = min (c2i + C3i)yi, + c3i(f, - DEiw)
i=1 i=1
s.t Yi, > DE w - f
Yiw < Capai
Yiw 2 0 (2.3)
The dual of the subproblem is
I I
Dual: z,(x) = max (DEjw + xi)Piw + Capaqiqw
p,q i=1 i=1
s.t pi, + qiw < c2i + c3i
Pi, Ž 0, qjw < 0 (2.4)
Now the master problem can be written as:
I W
Master: min • ic i + prwzw(x)
X,ZI,Z2,...Zw
i=1 w=1
s.t x <• Capai
I I IS-(DE., - xi)piw + Capaiqi - cai(xi - DEiw) •< zw
i=1 i=1 i=1
xi o 0 (2.5)
Where pjw, qiw are the returned dual solution after solving the subproblem. A
constraint will be added to the master problem once a subproblem is solved. A
commonly used constraint generation algorithm [5] based on Bender's Decomposition
will be applied to solve the large scale problem.
2.4.1 Numerical Result
Table 2.5 shows the comparison between the performance of Simplex method and
Bender's Decomposition algorithm when solving the problems of different sizes. Note
that the decomposition approach exhibits slightly better efficiency when the problem
is small, but far outperforms the Simplex method as the size increases.
Table 2.5: Comparison between LP and Bender's decomposition
Simplex Method Bender's Decomposition
Discretization Iterations Solving time(s) Solving time(s)
13 6523 21.38 19.96
17 13652 112.91 94.40
21 24392 405.63 186.06
29 38464 1456.84 876.46
There are various ways to configure the Bender's Decomposition algorithm. For
instance, we can change the number of constraints generated during each iteration,
which will affect the convergence of the duality gap. Table 2.6 and Figure 2-7 illustrate
the convergence rate under several constraints generation strategies.
Table 2.6: Constraints generation strategies
# of Block per Iteration Master Iteration Master Iteration
200 77 15400
400 48 19200
800 25 20000
1600 14 22400
3200 9 28800
10 20 30 40
Iterations
50 60 70 80
Figure 2-7: Duality Gap
Given the problem configuration, it has a total of 4319 blocks. Varying the con-
straints generated per iteration from 200 to 3200, we observe that the algorithm
converges faster when adding more constraint per iteration, whereas the total con-
straints generated in the master problem decrease, which makes the master problem
:::::::::::::. ::::::::: .::::::.::::::::::: ::: ::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::...:  .... . .. .. .:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
:::: : :::::::::::::i::::: : :i:::::: :::::::1:::::::: :::::: •--• o0
.. . . . : . . . . .. . . .............. .
........ ...... : ................-. ........... :..............• ............. .........: .  .......... ............................... ..  =0 . . .. .. ..... .......... ..... ....... ... . .... ........ ..............a*K=200
.... .......... . ... ... 8 0........
............... ......... .... ......
........ ....................... ................... .....
. . . .. .. , . .. ............... ... . ......... ... ... .. .. .... -v . . . .. . .. . . .. ........ ........ : :.... .. i ... ...... . .iiiil~~ii~j~i "'~1Ciii.......................... K=1600 .i OK= 8
. . . . .- - . .. ....... . ....... . ...... i ...... .. • .. .. i. . .. . .. ..........  .. . . . .... .......... .... ... .. .....
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: :: : : ::::: ::: ::: :: : :: : ::::..... ::. . . . .......................: ::: : :: ::: :::S....... .
....... 
.
. . .
.. .
... . . . . . .............. ...... .............ý 
: 
: : : : ... ..... ....
· · · ·. '..... ... ....... ...... ......... . . . .. . . .. . .: . .. ..  . . .. . . . .. . . .
."" ~ ' i ,......... . . . . .. . .. . . .. . . . . .. . . ... . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .
.. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. .. .. .
_...... .............. .........................._ ; .......... ...j........ ....: ...................
..... ...::·: .............................iiiiiiiiiii'iiiii" """~  "":: ijii iiii iiiiiiji.................iiiii:................ ........
... . .. ... . ... .. ... ... . .... 1 . .... .. : ... . . .... .. .  .... ... ... ... ... .
....................... . ........... . .. ...... ......... ........... ................
............................................................ . .... .. ........... ........ ..................···
harder to solve. On the whole, the scenario with more constraints generated per
iteration performs more efficiently than the scenario with less.
2.5 Multiple Period Planning Model
The model (2.1) is a single period planning model that only takes into account meet-
ing one-time demand, and assigns a relatively high cost to the production that exceeds
the demand. In practice, other than the fab equipment, some fab materials are rather
"built to stock," such as wafers, substrates, etc. Therefore, suppliers have a tendency
to plan the production of their product ahead of time by setting up inventory, ac-
cording to their demand forecast. In this section, we extend the previous model to
a multiple period planning model. Using this model, companies can make optimal
production as well as inventory decision, on a monthly or quarterly basis.
Additional Notation
* t: The number of periods during the planning horizon
* Dtj,: Demand for fab j in period t under scenario w
* Htij: The amount of product i needed to build a fab j in period t
* DEti.: Demand for product i under demand scenario w in period t, DEi =
Htij x Dtjw
* clti: The cost of producing equipment i in stage one of period t, million $/item
* c2ti: The cost of producing equipment i in stage two of period t, million $/item
* Cti: The cost of storing product i in period t, million $/item
* Capati: The capacity of product i production in period t
Scenarios Let nti be the number of discrete points that approximate the dis-
tribution of the demand for fab i in period t. Then the total number of scenarios
T I
t=1 i=1
Decision Variables
* xti: The amount of product i produced in stage one of period t
* yi,: The amount of product i produced in stage two of period y, under demand
scenario w
* Ii,,: The inventory of product i in period t, under demand scenario w
Assumption 2.5.1. Let the holding cost of a piece of equipment per period be 20%
of its production cost.
Assumption 2.5.2. The initial inventory before the first period is zero.
The Model:
T I W T I T I
min : cl,t,ixt + prw( c2,titiw ti tiw)
t=1 i=1 w=1 t= 1 i=  t=1 i=1
s.t xt,i :_ Capat,j
It-l,i,x + xt,i + Yt,i,w _ DEŽ,i,w
Yt,i,w < Capat,i
It,i,w = It-l,i,w + xt,i + Yt,i,w - DEt,i,w
xt,i, Yt,i,w, It,i,w Ž 0, IO,i,w = 0 (2.6)
Adding one more dimension, the time dimension makes the problem becomes
increasingly large. The pure simplex method will not be able to deliver an efficient
solution to even a "simple" problem. Again, the Bender's Decomposition will be a
suitable way to tackle the large scale problem. The procedure is implemented using
the same algorithm in Section 2.4. The sub and master problems are:
T I T I
Sub: zv,() = min E C2,ti +>,i 3>3 E t, ,i,ow
t=1 i=1 t=1 i=1
s.t It-l,i,w + Yt,i,w > DEtiw - ti
Yt,i,w - Capat,i
It,i,w - It-1,j,w - Yt,i,w = Xt,i - DEti,,
Yi,w, It,w,w > 0 (2.7)
T I W
Master : mill E C1,t,iXt,i + Pw zw (x)
t=l i=1 w=l
s.t xt,i < Capai
T I T I T I
E E(DEt,i,w - xt,i)Pt,i,w + E E Capat,t,, - rt,i,(xt,i- DEt,i,w) z
t=l i=1 t=l i=1 t=l i=1
Xt, i 2 0 (2.8)
Where pt,i,w, qt,i,w and rt,i,w are the dual solution of the sub problem.
2.5.1 Numerical Example
We propose the following planning case that has a time horizon of five periods. There
is one fab that demands four types of product through the five periods. The demand
of the fab, particularly the standard deviation, varies across all periods, reflecting the
demand volatility changes over time. We take the case as a motivating example to
illustrate the multiple period planning strategy.
Table 2.7: Multiple period demand distribution
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Fab 1 25 2.5 27 1 22 5 24 2 23 4
Table 2.7 shows the demand information. Note that the third and fifth period
and have a high magnitude of volatility. The optimal planning strategy is given in
the figure 2-8.
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Figure 2-8: Multiple periods planning strategy (four equipment types)
As shown above, during volatile period, the company has to "rush order" more
production in stage two when the demand is realized. However, building inventory
can be efficient protective strategy against the uncertainty because the holding cost
is much lower than the "rush off' cost. Figure 2-9 shows that under optimal strategy,
more inventory will be reserved during the periods before the high volatility begins. In
this manner, the demand shortage can be absorbed by the buffer inventory, avoiding
the cost of late penalty.
This example sheds some light on the product planning and inventory strategy
in a given time frame. Managers have to establish a clear overview of how demand
Period
Figure 2-9: Inventory strategy
volatility changes over time and leverage inventory strategy in a proactive way. The
proposed model will serve as a powerful tool in assisting their decision making.
2.6 Summary
In this Chapter, we discussed semiconductor equipment production planning given
demand uncertainty, in an attempt to address the previous empirical study on the
supplier's "order-fulfillment" dilemma. First, we developed a stochastic linear pro-
gramming optimization model, to serve as an effective tool to quantify the "dilemma"
and provide optimal production strategies that minimize the total cost including the
costs of both "early and be wrong" as well as "wait and be late". Second, we prvided
a case example to illustrate the model, and analyze the optimal decisions under dif-
ferent uncertainty levels. Third, we studied the computational aspect of the model
and introduced Bender's Decomposition to cope with the large scale. Finally, we
extend our original model to a multiple period planning model, to consider inventory
management over a period of time. To summarize, we draw our conclusions on both
computational and managerial perspective.
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2.6.1 Computational Implications
The problem quickly becomes difficult to solve, when the number of fabs is large or
the demand discretization is fine. The situation with a multiple period model is even
worse. Though the Bender's Decomposition lessens the computation intensity, for
those very large problems, it still has limitations. In order to manage the computation,
we first need to understand the underlying trade-off between accuracy and efficiency:
the more accurate solution we want, the heavier computation we have to bear. Second,
there are several ways to reduce the complexity of the problem. Specifically, we can
distinguish the discretization policy according to the property of the demand. For
example, we use denser discretization to approximate the demand with high standard
deviation. In contrast, we approximate the demand with low deviation using sparser
discretization (See Fig 2-10).
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Figure 2-10: Discretization strategy
2.6.2 Managerial Implications
As illustrated earlier, demand uncertainty negatively impacts the entire supply chain,
not only raising additional costs, but also destroying the ability of responsiveness. The
painful experiences between tool suppliers and chip makers highlight the need for joint
forces to build relationships and mitigate the demand uncertainty. Several strategies
are suggested.
Enhance information sharing. Information distortion, delay and misperception
have been proven as the main causes of "bullwhip effect"' [24]. Close and frequent
sales and forecast information sharing between suppliers and buyers will help elimi-
nate some degrees of demand volatility and offers both parties a more supply chain
visibility.
Build collaborative contracts. Because late order fulfillment is less costly than
"early and be wrong" [7], equipment supplier is conservative about delivering to
uncertain order forecast, which sadly is the last thing the chip company wants to see.
Therefore, the chip company will have the incentive to help its supplier minimize the
chance of late production. Instead of the supplier paying all the costs, both sides
could redesign their contract such that the chip company subsidizes the supplier and
encourage early delivery but heavily penalize any late delivery.
Leverage Postponement. The concept of postponement was initially developed in
the case of HP inkjet printers, which states that the common parts that all types of
printer share are assembled in early stage production while leaving the customized
parts postponed until demand becomes clear. This strategy can greatly help alleviate
the demand uncertainty, without running production late. Similarly, the equipment
supplier could store and assemble some subsystems in the early stage, and finish the
remaining manufacturing when receiving the full information.

Chapter 3
Modeling the Industry Dynamics
In this chapter, we will model the semiconductor industry using System Dynamics.
The model addresses the topics of global electronics demand projection, semiconduc-
tor capacity planning, fabrication production, equipment cost and R&D investment.
In addition, the model simulates the dynamics of product flow, information flow as
well as capital flow within the three industry sectors. The model could help managers
to obtain a holistic overview of the industry dynamics and understand the impact of
operation and technology strategies.
The organization of this chapter is: In Section 3.1, we construct the basic structure
of the System Dynamics model. Then, we study explicitly the mechanism of each
component of the model in Section 3.2-3.6. Finally, in Section 3.7, we demonstrate
the simulation results and compare some of them with the actual data.
3.1 Model Formulation
System Dynamics is a control theory-based approach and was originally invented
in MIT in the 1960s. It has been widely used in engineering system analysis by
modeling closed-loop feedback systems [16]. Recently, the System Dynamics approach
has gained extensive popularity in modeling business processes [38], particularly in
operations management.
A high level overview of the industry dynamics model is given in Figure . Trig-
gered by electronics demand, the semiconductor sector allocates capacity to meet the
demand for more semiconductor components, which in turn stimulates the demand
for fabrication equipment. The overall cost of fabrication operation plus competition
determines the average price of semiconductor, which in turn affects the semiconduc-
tor demand. That is a closed-loop feedback mechanism. Referring to the definition
in System Dynamics, this feedback loop is defined as the reinforcing loop: increas-
ing demand sets in motion more fabrication capacity. New fabrication leverages the
leading-edge process technology that contributes to improved productivity and cost
reduction. Then the lower cost results in cheaper semiconductor price, which subse-
quently drives stronger demand. The technology transitions, namely the feature size
and wafer size, play a central role in setting the pace of the whole industry.
We analyze the chip industry based on three major segments in terms of the
product type: memory, microcomponent and foundry. The market leader of each
segment (Intel, Samsung and TSMC) exerts significant impact on the investment and
adoption of new technologies. Table 3-1 illustrates the product types and companies
of each segment.
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Figure 3-1: Model Structure
Table 3.1: Classification of chip companies
Category Product Company
Memory Flash, DRAM, NOR Samsung, Toshiba
Microcomponent Microprocessor, Microcontroller Intel, AMD
Foundry "Pure" Foundry TSMC, UMC
Although there are as many as a dozen types of key tools (equipment) in a wafer
fab, for simplicity, we divide them into two types, which we refer to as beam tools
and non-beam tools. Beam tool refers to the lithography related equipment, which
represents the highest capital expenditure among all the toolsets. Lithography fea-
ture size is also the key indicator of the latest fabrication process technology. For
beam tools, wafer processing costs are roughly proportional to the wafer area to be
processed. For non-beam tools, wafer processing costs are roughly proportional to
the number of wafers processed, independent of wafer size.
Table 3.2: Classification of toolsets
Category Product
Beam Tool Lithography, Implant, Metrology
Non-beam Tool Etch, deposition(CVD), furnace
Given the casual structure of the model in Figure 3-1, we define the three main
components of the systems dynamics model as follows:
Demand Modeling: This part of the model will address the worldwide demand
for electronics as a function of global economic development. The electronics demand
then translates into the demand for semiconductor.
Semiconductor Fabrication Operation and Capacity Planning: This part
of the model will characterize the mechanism of fabrication capacity allocation, pro-
duction system and cost structure.
Equipment Production and R&D spending: This part of the model will
demonstrate the production of fabrication equipment suppliers and their R&D in-
vestment in delivering the process-compatible products.
3.2 Modeling Electronics Demand
Worldwide electronics is a rapid growing industry, whose demand sets in motion the
entire semiconductor supply chain. According to IC Knowledge [17], electronics sales
grew at 6.3% annually from 1980 to 2000. As a result of the IT bubble bust, the
growth stopped from 1999 to 200 and resumed again with a bullish CAGR of 12.7%
from 2002 to 2007 [41]. To understand this soaring revenue figure, we employ a
tertile-based global economy and electronics consumption model.
The world population is split into three equal-sized tertiles in terms of the per
capita GDP, which is used to measure the wealth of a nation. The 1st tertile (high
income) includes those developed countries in North America, Western Europe and
Asia; the 2nd tertile (mid income) mainly comprises of the developing countries in
Asia, South America and Eastern Europe. The last tertile (low income) encompasses
the countries in Asia, Africa, etc. The three demographically largest countries, United
States, China and India, reside in each of the tertile, respectively. The following table
illustrates some typical countries of each tertile.
Table 3.3: Tertile countries
Tertile Representative Countries Tertile Population
Low income India, Vietnam, Nigeria, 1/3 World Population
Bangladesh, Pakistan
Mid income China, Indonesia, Egypt, Ukraine 1/3 World Population
High income North America, Western Europe, 1/3 World Population
Japan, South Korea, Singapore
Very poor people spend most or all of their income on subsistence needs: food,
shelter, clothing, etc. As people's income grows, they begin to spend some of their
discretionary income on luxury goods, including electronics. However, nothing grows
forever. People dwell in different income tertile show different consumption pattern.
A rational consumer in the lowest income quintile couldn't afford any electronics un-
til they have surplus over their spending on necessities; consumers in a middle tier
developing country such as China, notably the rising middle class [11][23], are likely
to consume increasing amount of electronics, which could not only facilitate the work
environment (i.e. blackberry) but also improve the life standard (i.e. HDTV); an
average customer in the developed country is almost saturated with the state-of-the-
art electronics. An increase in wage gives the customer little incentive to buy more
electronics, except for emerging products (i.e. iPhone). This phenomenon could be
visualized in terms of what was described in Sterman's book as "S-shape" growth [38].
Assumption 3.2.1. The GDP and Population of each Tertile grow at constant
CAGR. The initial values and growth rates are shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Tertile countries
Tertile 1999 GDP(B Intl'$) 1999 Pop(M) GDP CAGR PopCAGR
Low income 3017.14 2036.524 5.1% 1.3%
Mid income 5984.48 2036.524 6.5% 1.3%
High income 26189.81 2,036.524 2.2% 1.3%
The data source of assumption 3.1 is the World Data Indictor (WDI) and worldmap-
per project'. To quantify the "S-shape" growth, we use Logistic Regression to fit the
curve with the available data. The annual electronics sales data is obtained from
Euromonitor International, which includes 30 countries' sales data across the three
tertiles.
Let v be the per capita GDP and V be the per capita electronics revenue. Both of
them are measured in Geary-Khamis dollar2 . The formula of the logistic regression
function is given as:
1
0M1 (3.1)1 + e(-(av+P))
Where a and 0 are the logistic coefficients that needs to be estimated. By manip-
ulating the formula, this nonlinear problem can be transformed into linear regression.
e-(av+3)- 4(v) (3.2)S(3.2)1 - (v)
In =() av + • (3.3)1 - ?P(v)
Let V = [v1, v 2 , . , v 30] and U = [01, 02, ,0 30] be the dataset of v and V.
Since the range of function (3.1) is [0, 1], we need to normalize before using it in the
1see http://www.worldmapper.org/, Original Data are from Maddison's The World Economy:
Historical Statistics, OECD Development Centre
2The unit currency that adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP), also known as international
dollar.
regression.
S)max-- min , "i = In 1 , i= 1, 2,-, 30
Having U* and V built into (3.3), we obtain the parameters & and ~ through least-
square estimation. The "S-shape" logistic regression function can thus be expressed
as:
(v) = + d (3.4)
1 + e(-(v"+3))
Where c = Omax - ..min and d = lmin. An important property of the demand
function is the demand elasticity which is defined in economics as the ratio of the
change in one variable with respect to the change in another. Let ( be the elasticity
of electronics demand with respect to individual gross income:
de v c& x e (- (" v+4)) v e(- (+ & + ())S= - x - = - x av , av (3.5)
dv p (1 + e(-( -'v+)))2 i+e- ( +  1 + e(-(sv+
The proximity is achieved when the term e(-(&+4)) is sufficiently large.
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Figure 3-2: Electronics demand S-shape growth
As shown in Figure 3-2, the logistic regression model well fits the actual elec-
tronics sales data in 1998, 2001 and 2006. The R-square of this regression is 0.672.
Over the eight years, countries have been continuously embarking on new phases
of the "S-shape" growth: Low earning countries go uphill, pursuing electronics ag-
gressively, whereas rich counties have migrated into a more saturated stage. Under
this assumption, we can project the future electronics demand by extrapolating the
key economic index according to assumption 3.1 and map it into the output of the
regression model. Figure 3-4 presents the electronics demand module that has the
regression model embedded in. The modeling language and software is from Vensim
[42].
Equations that are used in the diagram:
1. World Tertile Gross Domestic Product=INTEGRAL(GDP Growth Rate/Tertile])
2. World Tertile Population=INTEGRAL(Population Growth Rate[Tertile])
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Figure 3-3: Causal structure of electronics demand
3. Tertile GDP per capita= World Tertile Gross Domestic Product/World Tertile
Population
4. Tertile Dollar in Electronics per capita=--- (Tertile GDP per capita, Electronics
Demand Elasticity)
5. Tertile Discretionary Income in Electronics=Tertile Electronics
Consumptionx World Tertile Population
6. Tertile Purchasing Rat=(Tertile Discretionary Income in Electronics-Tertile
Electronics Purchase)/Tertile Purchase Reaction Time
The dynamics are run separately by tertiles in order to illustrate different con-
sumption patterns. The tertile GDP and population volume are generated based on
the projected growth rate assumptions (3.1) through the simulation horizon. As the
discretionary income in electronics rises, it takes a while for consumers to react to the
change and place new electronics purchases. This reaction lag is defined as perception
delay [38], as one of the three major delays discussed in Sterman's textbook. Assume
the customers in the low income countries take longer reaction time than those in the
mid tertile. The mid income customers, in turn, react more slowly than the wealthy
people. Such perception delay can be interpreted as the time for people to perceive
the fashion or to use the bank saving to purchase.
3.3 Modeling Electronics Forecast and Production
Time to Perveive the
Purchase> Lead Time
Figure 3-4: Causal structure of electronics forecast and production
Equations that are used in the diagram:
1. Change in PPED = (Total Electronics Purchase - PPED)/TPPED
2.PPED = INTEGRAL(Change in PPED)
3. Change in PET = (Indicated Electronics Trend - PET)/TPET
4.PET = INTEGRAL(Change in PET)
5.Change in ERC = (PPED-ERC)/THERC
6.ERC = INTEGRAL(Change in ERC)
7.Indicated Electronics Trend = [(PPED-ERC)/ERC]/THERC
8.Forecasted Electronics Demand = PPEDx (1 + PET)Ele
tronicsForecastHorizon
The forecast module is modeled according to the mechanism of TREND Function
in Vensim. Unlike the prevalent forecasting tools (time series, exponential smooth),
the TREND function reflects a behavioral process [38] of how people take time to
collect and analyze historical data and form the expectation of growth rate, and take
the time required to react to changes (perception delay) into account. The TREND
function outputs a forecasted electronics demand growth rate, which is then used to
calculate the projected demand over the time horizon. When the current capacity
becomes inadequate for the expected future demand, new capacity will be initiated
and built. The equations used in the planning and production are:
1.Electronics Forecast Horizon=Electronics Production Cycle Time+Semiconductor
Chip lead time
2.Electronics Shortage=Forecasted Electronics Demand-Electronics
WIPx (1-MIN(Electronics Forecast Horizon/Electronics Production Cycle time, 1))
3.Electronics Starts=DELAY3(PECS, Semiconductor Chip Lead time + Decision
Delay on Electronics Capacity Planning)
4.Electronics Production Rate=Electronics Volume WIP / Electronics Production
Cycle Time
5.Electronics Shipment Rate=MIN(Total Electronics Purchase, Electronics
Inventory)
6.Electronics Delivery Rate=Electronics Shipped / Electronics Delivery Lead time
Assumption 3.3.1. No backlog is considered in the model. In electronics such a
turbulent market, fail to move the products means the loss of customers.
The time horizon for the demand forecast is determined by both the material and
production lead time. Typically, when a capacity shortage is realized, the manu-
facturer has to replenish raw materials or equipment from its supplier, then start a
new production cycle as soon as the all required materials are delivered. Hence, the
capacity shortfall won't materialize until all finished electronics are in place, which
takes a full cycle time plus chip lead time. The amount of production initiated will
be subject to delays caused by material delivery as well as decision delay (execution
delay), which is modeled as 3rd order exponential delay.
The firm's production system is a standard "pipeline" model. Each stock rep-
resents a physical node that a product travels through during its life cycle (factory,
inventory, transportation, install base). As visualized by a valve controlling the flow,
the production rate equals the amount of WIP divided by the production cycle time
[13]. For instance, suppose the production cycle time is ten months, then the com-
pletion rate of finished goods at a specific time accounts for ten percent of the total
work-in-progress volume. The same principle applies to order delivery rate as well as
other pipeline-related modeling in this study.
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Figure 3-5: An illustration of demand volatility
As most of the supply chain literatures point out, long lead time is one of the
contributors to the cause of demand volatility or "bullwhip effect" [24]. Under non-
stationary demand, since the forecast horizon is an increasing function of the lead
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time, long lead time will render the demand signal processed in an exaggerated form.
Suppose a manager observe 10% demand surge at time t, assuming the forecast hori-
zon is ten time units, he then extrapolates the demand at time t+ 10 to be 1.110 • 2.6
times bigger than the present, which makes very little sense to place such a balloon
order! On the other hand, our production smoothing model implies that, to meet a
3% demand rise at time t + 1, an additional capacity of 30% has to be built, assuming
the production cycle time is ten time units, to catch the ongoing growth. This turns
a normal demand signal into a chaotic capacity up and down. More discussions of
long lead time will be presented in Chapter 4.
Figure 3-5 shows a simulated illustration of the volatility amplification based on
proposed model in this section. The magnitude of the perceived electronics demand
cyclicality far exceeds the real demand as the lead time increases.
3.4 Semiconductor Fabrication Operation and Ca-
pacity Planning
The semiconductor industry, distinct from other industries, has a unique manufactur-
ing facility - wafer fabrication. It is a highly sanitary, automated and sophisticated
manufacturing process, requiring complex operation and high level of efficiency. We
model the chip industry in a more disaggregated way. Unlike the electronics pro-
duction model, the semiconductor production system will be dissected and analyzed
based on its fab operation, cost structure and capacity planning, separately.
3.4.1 Modeling Fab Operation
Figure 3-6 shows the structure of semiconductor fab operation, taking memory fab
as an example. The microcomponent and foundry segments have the same modeling
structure. An individual fab has a lifetime of approximately fifteen years and is
operated on a depreciation basis. Typically, fabs took eighteen months to design
and construct, and twelve months or more to scale up to full capacity [10]. Our fab
flow pipeline simulates how fabs evolve throughout a life cycle: construction, on-line,
ramp-up and phasing out.
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Figure 3-6: Causal Structure of Fab Operation
Assumption 3.4.1. The life cycle of fabs is 15 years. A fab takes two years to ramp
up to full scale, stays at full scale for eight year and phases out during the rest of its
life.
The capacity of a specific fab is measured in terms of wafer-starts-per-month
(KWPM), the number of thousand yielded wafer produced every month. A fab's
Capacity usually ranges from 30 KWPM to 80 KWPM. Except for the fabs that ramp
up to full scale, other fabs experiences underutilization due to equipment calibration
and less optimized procedure in the early phase, or equipment maintenance and wear
off in the late phase. In this case, we let the utilization of the fabs comes on-line and
fabs phasing out be 80 percent and 60 percent of the full capacity respectively.
Assumption 3.4.2. The capacity of all fabs is 30 KWPM. Fabs that come on-line
have the utilization of 80%; Fabs that phase out have the utilization of 605%.
A number of fab processes have been encapsulated in the fab flow pipeline using the
Vensim subscript technique (similar as creating an array of variables under the same
name). Besides capacity, a fab process is also determined by wafer size, feature size
as well as product category. In memory industry, for example, a "30KWPM 200mm-
180nm DRAM" process describes a fab that produces 180nm linewidth DRAM chips,
at the production rate of 30,000 wafers out per month, whose wafer diameter is 200
mm. The die and transistor yield of a particular fab process varies with respect to
the wafer size and feature size. Generically, larger wafers can accommodate more dies
per wafer; thinner linewidths would allow a fixed size die yielding more transistors.
Therefore, as technology keeps progressing, fabs manufacture ever-advanced products
and become increasingly productive. The process-specific data (i.e. die yield, chip
density) is generated from the IC Knowledge Cost model [17].
3.4.2 Fab Cost Structure
Quantifying the fab operation cost is a very complex task because there is a wide
spectrum of cost components, many of which are hard to measure precisely. Though
the IC Knowledge (ICK) cost model is the most pervasive one that many parties refer
to, there are still a lot of controversies over some cost items and its nontransparent
data overall. The fab cost model in this section is developed to integrate the output
of IC cost model and add dynamic features to it.
Assumption 3.4.3. The Fab operation cost is categorized into fixed cost and variable
cost.
Based on the taxonomy of the ICK cost model, we have toolsets cost, maintenance
cost, factory and building cost, facilities cost and consumable cost categorized as the
fixed cost because they are either overhead cost or deprecation-based cost and don't
vary with volume. In comparison, the labor cost, wafer sort cost as well as wafer cost
are grouped as the variable cost since they are proportional to the wafer volume.
In reality, the average per unit cost doesn't stay constant as the volume increases.
Lean manufacturing and cost reduction are the goals that every firm is pursuing. Over
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Figure 3-7: Causal Structure of Fab Cost Structure
time, fabs would achieve higher efficiency, less waste and more skilled workforce, by
leveraging economy of scale and learning effect. We hypothesize that economy of
scaletakes effect only on the variables cost. Let Ci the unit cost($/waf) after the
scale and learning effect, C9 be the original unit cost, be V the present wafer volume
and Vo be the baseline volume below which no benefit is enjoyed. Thus the scale and
learning effect is modeled as [20]:
= C ° x (V) (3.6)
Where A is the scale coefficient. Recall the definition of demand elasticity in (3.5),
we use the same algebra to define how elastic the cost reduction in response to the
scale up. Denote s,,cal as the scale elasticity:
Gscale = x-  V = - VA-1 x (0) x V'- = A (3.7)dV O \ VVl
Hence, the elasticity equals to the scale coefficient. Suppose the wafer yield ramps
up y percent then the company will enjoy a yA percent cost reduction. The scale
coefficient thus behaves as an indicator of firm's scale and learning capability.
Note that the average transistor cost across all different fab processes is calculated
by the model (see Fig 3-7). Also, the fab capacity allocation model (see the next
section) uses transistor volume to measure the semiconductor demand. Furthermore,
transistor price will be used in next section as the unit price that affects the demand
in the market. The reasons we choose transistor as the semiconductor unit count are
the following:
* Due to wide variety of chip categories (i.e. DRAM, flash, MCU, MPU), it is
hard to find one that can be used to measure the volume across the board. Yet
underlying the chip surface are billions of transistors that form the building
blocks of all sorts of chips, which makes the aggregation the transistor volume
of different fab processes plausible.
* Transistor scale indicates the pace of technology innovation. In this information
era, people are commanding increasing computing power, which is translated
into more transistors in their electronics devices; the technology node transitions
shrink the linewidth, allowing chips to cram more transistors into increasingly
small areas.
* Transistor scaling down is regarded as the true enabler of Moore's law [29]. In
addition, cost per transistor has been taken by analysts and consortia [28] as an
important indicator of industry productivity trend as well as whether Moore's
Law keeps on track.
3.4.3 Capacity Planning
Analogous to the electronics production planning, chip manufacturers adjust their
fab capacity based on demand forecast and current capacity. Recall that the operat-
ing capacity is diminishing due to the depreciation loss whereas the capacity under
construction takes a long delay to come online. The capacity shortage is modeled as:
1.Demand Forecast Horizon = Equipment Lead time + Average Fab Building time
2.Predicted New Capacity Online = MIN(Demand Forecast Horizon/Average Fab
Building time,1)x Fab Forthcoming Capacity
3.Predicted Fab Depreciation = Demand Forecast Horizon Fab))x Depreciation Rate
4.Predicted Fab Capacity = Current Fab Capacity)x (1-Predicted Fab
Depreciation) +Predicted New Fab Capacity Online
5.Predicted Capacity Shortage = Forecasted Demand of Semiconductor Chip -
Predicted Fab Capacity
Figure 3-8: Causal Structure of Semiconductor Capacity Planning
Assumption 3.4.4. The volume of semiconductor (memory, microcomponent and
foundry) is measured by giga-transistors. The demand function is written as:
SemiconductorVolume =
Electronics Demand x Semiconductor as % of Electronics
Average Transistor Price
The demand function behaves as a decreasing function of transistor price. With
cheaper transistor prices, customers can afford more computing power and functional-
ity given a fixed discretionary income on electronics. Based on the average transistor
cost derived from the cost model, we assume that firms could price their product by
adding a desirable profit margin. Figure 3-9 lays out the pricing mechanism.
<Perceived Memory
Figure 3-9: Causal Structure of Pricing system
Semiconductor firms in the market are inevitably exposed to fierce competition.
Competition impacts the profitability in the way that rivalries compete intensively
on price. Porter's theory states that the situation is intensified if there are numerous,
equal-sized competitors that compete on the same product[32]. To quantify price com-
petition, we assume the target industry follows the Cournot competition model where
firms produce homogeneous product and make production decision simultaneously[6].
Define P = a - 3Q as the industry demand function, where P is the price, Q is the
quantity. n homogenous firms each produces quantity Q. The profit of an individual
firm is given as:
n
r = (P - C)Qi = (a - c - O1 Q)Qi. i = 1, 2, 3...n (3.8)
j=1
Where c denotes the cost. Thus its optimal production decision can be derived from
1st order derivative:
d~rri n
di = - - 2Qi - E QJ = 0 (3.9)
j=l,jAi
Note that n firms are symmetric, so at equilibrium, Q* = Q ...- = Q*, thus:
a-c a+ ncQ2 = ,+ 1)' P* = (3.10)(n+1)13' n+1
Moreover,
a-c a-c (a-c)27ri = (P* - c)* Q (3.11)S(P* = (n + 1)(n + 1) (n + 1)2 3
Under monopoly setting (n = 1) in which a large firm encroaches the lion share,
we have:
a- a+c (a - c)2Q- = P* = 7 - (3.12)23 ' 2 4i
Therefore, the ratio of competitive market profit over monopoly profit is:
7rn, nrri 4n 1
- - n , n --+ oo (3.13)
7r 7l (n + 1)2 n
The price erodes with respect to the number of players. As an economic indicator
of industry competition and concentration, the Herfindahl Index3 (denoted by H) is
introduced in this context to measure the profit margin under Cournot competition.
Consider the case all firms obtain equal market share, the Herfindahl Index then
equals to 1/n , which is consistent with the term that the profit erosion approximates
to. From this it is tempting to use H-Index as the multiplier to convert the monopoly
margin to the one in competitive market. Let ý be the monopoly margin, < be the
3 H is calculated by -i=1..n s?, where si is the market share of each firm
margin in the current market:
S= CH§l, 0 < 7 < 1, (3.14)
where y is the margin erosion adjusting parameter when n is small. With all the
above, the transistor price in the market is chosen to be:
Average Transistor Marginal CostTransistor Price = (3.15)
1 - Perceived Industry Margin
Back to capacity planning discussion, the capacity shortfall is replenished in parallel
with the technology upgrades. Note that the node transitions and wafer size transi-
tions keep the entire industry on track of the learning curve, and drive the leading
edge demand. So the emerging industry demand (i.e. quad-core, solid state drive)
is fulfilled dominantly by the most state-of-the-art fab processes that are equipped
with finer and more economical manufacturing procedures, while the old fashion fab
processes are depreciating and gradually phasing out.
The International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) serves as a
third party institution that provides technology assessment and coordinates tech-
nology roadmaps for chip manufacturers and equipment suppliers. Our roadmap
assumption applies the 2005 ITRS technology roadmap. It switches from two years
introduction intervals to three year introduction intervals for node transition at the
year 2009 when 65nm is carried out. Also, it schedules the 450mm wafer transition
at 2015.
Assumption 3.4.5. Industry Roadmap:
Table 3.5: Default node transition roadmap
Node 250nm 180nm 130nm 90nm 65nm 45nm 32nm 22nm
Year 1997 1999 2001 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
Wafer Transition
Roadmap
Memory Fab Roadmap Memory Fab
Building Plan #8 -Node Tnlon Bul ding Plan #2 -
Memory Fab 2015 RfedmP 1999 Memory Fab
Building Plan #7 - Bulding Plan U3 -
2012 201 emory Fab
Memory Fab Bulng Plan #4 -
Building Plan #6 -Prtal o Nem BB Pn 20W3
2009 P NMemory Fab
P wk.- Buing Plan #5 -
Memory Fab memory a.(by 2006
Building Plan #9 - Me -Memory Feb Buildi
2018 ng Plan 13 -2030
Mbemory FabBuldiMemory Feb Buildl Memory Feb BUN Plan #12 - 2027
ng Plan #10 - 2021 ng Plan #11 -2024
Memory Fab <Mem•xoy DieBuilding Decision ...---.. Yield per wafer>Delay N ew Wenmoy
Feb Start
>-r 
' ~' ' '  
. .Memory Fab
<Memury Clw, Capackty• (KWPM)>
Density>
P eailved
emionductory apa Capacity Planning (Continue)Shoftge (PMCS)
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Figure 3-10: Causal Structure of Semiconductor Capacity Planning (Continue)
Table 3.6: Default wafer sizetransition roadmap
Wafer 300mm 450mm
Year 2001 2015
The most state-of-the-art fab process penetrates slowly at the beginning. It ramps
up when the next process technology is introduced and starts to retire after the next
process technology starts to ramp up. To allocate new capacity to meet the demand
shortage, we have the following assumption.
Assumption 3.4.6. The a% of capacity shortage is fulfilled by the introduced fab
process, 3% is fulfilled by the mature fab process, -y% is fulfilled by the retiring fab
process. We have:
3.5 Modeling Equipment Supplier
As discussed before, equipment sector is split into beam tool segment and non-beam
tool segment. The demand of each segment is aggregated from their three downstream
buyers (memory, micro and foundry). Their forecast and production are modeled
as the standard system comparable to one used in electronics, with few additional
features. To avoid redundancy, the mechanics of this part of the model will not be
explained in detail.
B.e TW
Figure 3-11: Causal Structure of Equipment Supplier Production
3.6 Modeling Equipment Supplier R&D
Equipment suppliers spend a significant part of their revenue on R&D. The JPEAWG
team [2] has estimated that the percentage of supplier's revenue spent on R&D in-
creased from 8%-14% from 1995 to 2005 during which the 300mm wafer transition
is adopted. As the industry folklore indicates, equipment suppliers bore the bulk of
300mm transitional expense. For 450mm transition, suppliers have become extremely
conservative to take the lead, even reluctant to collaborate with the chip companies
to start new investment on R&D. To better understand this bottleneck, we build
the following 450mm R&D causal diagram that illustrates the R&D structure and
projects future cost of potential technology transitions.
<Node Transition <Wafer Transition
Roadmap> Roadmap>
Equipment Supplier
Wafer Transistion
E Associated R&D Cost
Equipment Supplier Equipment Supplier Wafer +Node Associated R&D Transistion Associated
+ Spr eadCost R&D Spread Cost -
Equipment Supplier Years equipmentNode Associated R&D
N ode Associated + Supplier Wafer R&DCost \cost Spread over
Total Equipment
Supplier R&D
Investment
Figure 3-12: Causal Structure of supplier R&D
The semiconductor technology roadmap fosters suppliers to continuously upgrade
and deliver process-compatible tools. Both node to node and wafer size transitions
have imposed R&D associated costs to suppliers in an additive way. As the litho-
graphic feature size evolves, the corresponding R&D costs are supposed to increase
accordingly. So is the wafer size expansion whose development costs spread over two
or more nodes' lifecycle. The model utilizes the PULSE and SMOOTH functions of
Vensim and generates supplier's total R&D expenses dispersed on a monthly basis.
3.7 Simulation Results
In this chapter, we developed a semiconductor industry dynamic model that captures
the demand projection, supply chain interaction, wafer fab operation as well as cost
and R&D analyses. The model is highly integral, providing holistic views of the
industry's performance on operational, technological and strategic levels.
Figure 3-13 shows the teritle related electronics purchases. The simulation runs
for 40 years from 1999 to 2039 on a monthly basis. Note that the middle wealth
group demonstrates a striking demand surge. Due to the high demand elasticity of
the mid-tertile, coupled with strong economic momentum, the electronics demand in
the medium income countries grows significantly and will overtake the wealthy tertile
as the leading electronics consumer group around 2025. Such trend could give the
industry ample confidence in the prospect of the future demand in the circumstance
that western countries suffer from economic recession or stagnancy. However, we note
that the GDP growth rate of the middle tertile may slow down as its wealth increases.
This possibility is not modeled but should be considered in subsequent analyses.
Terti lectroncs Consumption
* 34 42 n1 N3 35 W4 13 IQ3 26 20 2k4 23 31 336 3O 34OYIRI~~~~smoko~ 40 4M3 4X 4
Figure 3-13: Tertile electronics consumption
The result of global electronics revenue is shown in Figure 3-14 and compared with
the real electronics sales data to date (source: Euromonitor International Database).
After the first three years' stall (99-01), the demand starts to grow rapidly. The sim-
ulated result grasps and smoothes out this trend, and also forecast that the demand
will sustain with a CAGR of 6.4% after 2007, in the presence of a fast-expanding
middle class.
Figure 3-15 shows the simulated memory and microcomponent sales and compared
them with the data from World Semiconductor Trade Statistics. The results fit the
historical data accurately. Moreover, the simulated memory reveune is forecasted
to increase 11.8% annually between 2007 and 2012. The microcomponent revenue
is projected to grow 9.9% per year during the same period. Both growth rates are
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Figure 3-14: Simulated electronics revenue
consistent with IC Insight's projections.
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Figure 3-15: Simulated memory and microcomponent revenues
Figure 3-16 illustrates the dynamics of chip manufacturing capacity. According to
the forecast, new wafer fabs are built to meet the capacity shortage. The predicted
capacity, marked by green dash line, takes into account both the on-line fabs and
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upcoming fabs in construction. When the predicted capacity falls behind the forecast,
new fabs are initiated; in contrast, if the forecast overestimates the demand, no fabs
will be built until the shortage arises. Thus the predicted capacity appears to be
cyclical, aiming at keeping the fab capacity on track of the real demand.
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Figure 3-16: Memory demand and capacity allocation
Figure 3-17 and 3-18 show the silicon area volume of fab throughputs broken
down by process nodes as well as by wafer size generations. The 130nm node and
90nm node are overlapped by 200mm and 300mm wafer sizes during the transition
period. The 22nm node is overlapped by 300mm and 450mm wafer sizes. Therefore,
65 nm chips are solely produced by 300mm wafers and 16nm chips by 450mm. Both
nodes exhibit a surge of area demand. Referring to assumption 8, the throughput of
the current fab process ramps up when the previous node begins to retire, which is
explicitly shown in Figure 3-17.
Technology ScenO os
Figure 3-17: Simulated fab throughput(by technology node)
WaO e l ScenariDs
Figure 3-18: Simulated fab throughput(by wafer size)
Figure 3-19 shows the aggregated industry demand for wafer area. The demand
is projected with the annual growth rate of 7% in the future ten years. Figure 3-20
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illustrates the industry transistor productivity trend: 20% cost reduction per year.
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Figure 3-19: Simulated industry silicon area demand
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Figure 3-20: Simulated industry transistor productivity
Figure ?? shows the simulated R&D expenses of equipment suppliers. Feature
size transitions demand ever-increasing capital investment. Note that at the 90nm
transition, the node introduction interval shortens to two years, alleviating the av-
erage yearly R&D burden in investing and developing new equipment specifications.
Meanwhile, 300mm wafer transition occurs in conjunction with 130mm node; 450mm
is anticipated to go hand in hand with 22nm node. Various researches estimate the
total R&D cost for 300mm transition, ranging from $5.9B to $17.5B [15]. VLSI Re-
search [43] provides a neutral value $11.6 B, which is used in this simulation. Its
development costs are spreading over several years before and after the transition
takes place. Since 300mm investment significantly dwarfs the cost in any previous
transitions, the costs of 450mm transition are difficult to estimate. A simple extrap-
olation will create al astronomically high figure. According to the VLSI study, an
investment of $12B should be at least in place in 2010s. Tentatively, we estimate the
costs of propelling 450mm wafer size platform to be $16-18B in the next decade.
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Figure 3-21: Equipment supplier R&D cost
The proposed model also provides user interface for the clients to understand and
get access to the "Black Box" machinery. Specifically, users are allowed to adjust
parameters, change roadmap assumptions and perform sensitivity analysis. Figure 3-
22 provides a screenshot of the interface: the sliders presented on the left are for
experimentation with parameters. For example, users can change the forecast horizon
of chip demand to observe the distortion of demand signals, or rearrange the node
transition roadmap with different strategic scenarios.
The user interface provides the merits of ease-of-use, straightforwardness and flex-
ibility, avoiding customizing every single component of the model for respective firms
that differ in assumptions and scenarios.
Figure 3-22: Roadmaps control user interface
Chapter 4
Tackling the Supply-Demand
Mismatch
The bullwhip effect, also known as the beer game effect, is a pervasive phenomenon
existing in various industries. Its basic assertion is that the demand signal tends to
distort in an amplified form when looking upstream the supply chain. Suppose the
demand at the retailer end experiences a swing, the demand signal transmitted to
the wholesaler might be translated into bigger fluctuation while the demand observed
by the upstream supplier will have even greater oscillation. In our perspective, the
bullwhip effect, by its nature, is the result of coordination problems between supply
and demand. The intent of this section is to explore some of the symptoms, possible
causes and strategic prescriptions associated with this phenomenon explicitly in the
semiconductor industry.
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Figure 4-1: Industry Volatility
Figure 4-1 is an illustration of the magnitude of bullwhip effect in the semiconduc-
tor industry by VLSI Research. From 1961 to 2006, the worldwide GDP has increased
gradually with a relatively flat growth rate. The electronics consumption has been
constantly in a positive growth rate with quite a bit swing (0-20%). The subsequent
semiconductor productions have fluctuated greater in the range of -20% to 40%, the
equipment suppliers ultimately have faced an exaggerated order cyclicality up to plus
or minus 60%. Using our industry dynamics model, we simulate the similar cycli-
cal behavior within the three industry sectors (See Fig 4.1.1), which highlights the
strikingly high cyclicality that the equipment supplier suffers.
Given the extreme importance of equipment makers and the industry technology
clockspeed, the semiconductor supply chain is subjected to much larger bullwhip effect
than other industries where the primary upstream orders are delivered in the form
of parts or finished subcomponents. At first glance, unlike parts that are ordered
to assemble into the final product, equipment is purchased to run an entire plant.
Parts order allows any degree of variations, depending on the actual throughput and
safety inventory, whereas equipment comes in large increments and remains alive for
almost five years. Once in place, the equipment becomes a sunk cost. In addition,
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Figure 4-2: Simulated Industry Volatility
the plant needs capacity expansion, which results in a long procurement cycle. From
the financial statement of the : major tool makers [39], a fluctuating revenue curve
reflects the seasonal nature of the equipment demand, which leads to another reason
for supplier's adversity. Next, we will scrutinize synthetically the fundamental causes
Lee et al. have attributed the causes of bullwhip effect in a general supply chain
extent, applicable to chip industry, they haven't captured the essence of this phe-
nomenon in the semiconductor supply chain in particular. Generally speaking, the
semiconductor industry has high capital intensity, fast clockspeed, long production
lead time and long toolset ordering cycles. All these features are disadvantageous to
the construction of an ideal "3-A" supply chain [27]. Moreover, despite those physi-
cal demerits, historical implications ingrained in people's mindset sometimes lead to
even more disastrous consequences. Hence, we diagnose the root causes of the supply-
demand mismatch from the classic supply chain analysis as well as the psychological
clues that might affect the decision making.
4.1.1 Long Lead Time
Lee et al. [24] have presented a rigorous theorem that the variance of orders strictly
increase with the order replenishment lead time, in their first argument. Though
this result is universally correct in either parts suppliers or tool suppliers, it doesn't
explain explicitly the high magnitude of order variances occurring at tool makers as
illustrated by Figure . Alternatively, Anderson, Fine and Parker [1] have modeled a
macroeconomics mechanism that aggravates the supplier's volatility in the machine
tool industry: the investment accelerator. For example, assume that machine tools
have a life span of ten years and are replaced at a rate of 10% per year. Thus,
when chip makers buy the equipment necessary to expand the capacity to meet a 5%
demand increase, they have to purchase 50% more equipment.
The lead times in semiconductor production are long. Both fab construction
time and equipment lead time contribute to the length. On one hand, fabs take
roughly eighteen months to complete the design and construction process [36]. On
the other hand, due to the complexity and customization nature of the fab equipment,
its manufacturing lead time inclines to be lengthy, ranging from several months to a
year [7]. Consequently, it entails an equally long demand forecast horizon. Large chip
manufacturers usually implement market forecasts monthly or quarterly on a two-five
years basis and regularly update them [7]. Because demand forecasts will be directly
translated into capacity allocation and new fab building, a long forecast horizon will
easily lead to overly optimistic or overly pessimistic forecasts, which jeopardizes the
forecast reliability and reinforces the bullwhip effect. As we discussed in Chapter 2,
equipment suppliers face the "rush and be wrong" or "wait and be late" dilemma,
sometimes due to the larger number of soft orders that end up being cancelled, which
is known as "phantom order." Cohen et.al [7] collected a sample of 143 soft equipment
orders among which 43 were ultimately cancelled. Boeing used to experience such
forecast credibility problems with both its suppliers and buyers. Boeing projected an
ambitious growth of 747 jets and requested excessive parts and tools from its supplier
in 1997, one year before the Asian financial crisis. Fortunately, the suppliers refused
to believe Boeing's optimism and saved Boeing from creating a huge inventory pileup
[8]. The other story is that Northwest Airline cancelled a "phantom order" of 23
Boeing 737 jets in 2001 [12].
Another side-effect of long lead times is that it brings about a certain amount of
delays. Due to the supplier's order-fulfillment dilemma, tool makers have the tendency
to postpone the equipment manufacturing until the order becomes frozen so that the
risk of order uncertainty can be minimized, but they use this flexibility to trade off
an in-time delivery commitment. For example, among the 100 remaining equipment
purchase orders in Cohen's study, 76 of them experienced changes in the delivery date.
In addition, due to the capital intensity, new fab building and equipment purchase are
serious investment decisions to make in chip companies' top agenda and require lots of
administrative and financial coordination within the organization, which contribute
to substantial decision delays that impact the behaviors of forecast and production
as discussed in Chapter 3. The net effect of the above delivery and decision delays
is making the total lead time and forecast horizon even longer, thus magnifying the
volatility.
4.1.2 Fast Clockspeed
"Say you're building instrumentation products that will last ten to 15 years using
semiconductor components and other materials that may be available in the market
for only 18 to 36 months before they're discontinued. This situation presents me with
three alternatives: I have to buy and store a 13-year supply of components - that's a lot
of extra inventory. Or I'm forced to mortgage the future by pulling engineers off new
product development to reengineer products that still have a life in the marketplace.
Or I have to find brokers or others who are willing to take the risk of holding onto
unique and rapidly aging parts."
- Scott Beth, vice president of procurement at Intuit.
Harvard Business Review, 2003
The above speech is quoted from the HBR panel discussion on the topic of building
supply chain relationships [19]. Beth is stating the fact that it is difficult to manage
the purchase and inventory of semiconductor parts that have a short life cycle in the
market. Nowadays the new generations of semiconductor products are introducing
at a blistering speed thereby shrinking the time each product stays alive in the mar-
ketplace rapidly. Fine [14] has defined a "second law" of supply chain dynamics -
the clockspeed amplification. In contrast to the law of "bullwhip effect" where order
variances amplify as moving upstream the supply chain, the second law illustrates
a similar phenomenon occuring in the opposite direction: the product's clockspeed
increases as looking downstream the supply chain. The closer to end customers, the
faster the product's clockspeed. To exemplify this law, the semiconductor industry is
a case in point: the personal computers or iPod players normally have a lifetime of
several months before being upgraded; the semiconductor chips keep production for
two to four years until the introduction of new process technology; downstream to
the chip manufacturer is the fab tool makers that supply the fabrication tools with a
life cycle of more than five years, and the wafer suppliers that produce wafers of the
fixed size lasting about ten years.
Rather than the order amplification that is primarily driven by human behav-
iors, the clockspeed dynamics is more like a physical law that people are unable to
overcome. Instead, better understanding the industry clockspeed could help policy
makers improve the supply chain performance. In the semiconductor industry where
clockspeed changes swiftly, nobody could expect the availability of electronics or chips
is guaranteed for a long time. That creates the hard situation that Beth has faced:
you risk losing the supply of the fast-clockspeed component unless hedging the risk
by stocking up with adequate inventory. Therefore, the customers have strong incen-
tives to adopt forward-buying to avoid parts stockout, a situation also described in
Lee et al. as a result of price fluctuation, whereas clockspeed is the dominating factor
in this case. The quantity they purchase always largely exceeds their real demand,
worsening the order variance. Furthermore, the chip makers are sometimes obsessed
by the overordering and falsely hold high expectation about future demand. In 2007,
the DRAM industry has been tortured by a drastic price collapse. According to the
Elpida's perspective [35], the main reason for the collapse was the overproduction of
DRAM chips in anticipation of a bullish growth as the Windows Vista OS diffuses
rapidly. Nevertheless, some compatibility concerns lowered the adoption of Vista OS
far less than the anticipation. Chip makers were forced to mark down and clear the
bulk of excessive inventory. Such a great loss led Samsung to temporarily suspend its
DRAM supply to PC manufacturers.
In the case that supply falls short of demand, a rationing scenario will often be
employed by the manufacturer to allocate orders, which is also a major contributor
under Lee et al.'s framework. Since the customers know their order will be rationed,
they increase the quantity to the level more than they really need or place orders
to multiple vendors. Sometimes the perceived demand shortage merely comes from
anticipation or rumor. If the shortage and rationing never happen, order cancella-
tions flood in. In 1980s, PC companies predicted a shortage of DRAM chips. They
placed duplicate order from different suppliers and bought from the first one that
delivered then cancelled all the duplicate orders [25]. Another case occurring in the
1994 Christmas time, Motorola received drastic overordering by its customers who
anticipated a potential capacity shortfall [221. Such gaming behavior further exacer-
bates the degree of order variance that has already been augmented by the forward
ordering.
4.1.3 Moore's Law Misperceptions
In the popular press, Moore's law is described that the transistor count per die double
every 18-24 months. Moore's prediction has proved prescient for hour decades and still
hasn't shown any slowdown in the recent years. Underlying this exponential growth is
the rapid cost reduction that chip makers have enjoyed and an overwhelming optimism
that inexhaustible demand will probably never come to an end. Through the past
four decades, the semiconductor industry has prospered due to the success of digital
technology and Internet diffusion, reinforcing the persistence of Moore's Law. It also
has cemented in many people the beliefs that pursuing continuous cost reduction help
firms gain competitive advantages in this booming industry. The cost reduction is
measured by cost per transistor or cost per bit, which is achieved by leveraging the
technology innovation and economy of scale.
However, the zeal for progressing on the trajectory of Moore's Law might have
adverse effect if one focuses exclusively on the cost reduction and technology advance-
ment. As market equilibrium suggests, the chip performance/density scale up won't
have any commercial value unless there is sufficient demand for that. Although 4GB
DRAM chips are not get on the market, the production of NAND flash memory shot
up 30 % in 2007 [35] due to the strong demand for the storage medium in various
portable devices (digital camera, camcorder, iPod, etc.). Thus, the ITRS is founded
as an industry consortium to align the technology roadmap in a synchronized way
so that keeping the demand on track. On the other hand, to pursue cost reduction,
chip makers are prone to ramp up their production, expediting the progress on the
learning curve. Sadly, such effort, along with fierce competition, is usually translated
directly into price erosion. Newberry shows in his report [30] that the price drop of
DRAM and NOR chips are even greater than the cost reduction, generating a thin
or even negative margin that firms could hardly survive with. The capacity of those
chip makers is increased much faster than the demand (as high as 50% unit growth
per year), striving to achieve the leadership position in the economy of scale. Some
Logic IDMs also experiences the same "profitless prosperity": they are unable to earn
sufficient cash to invest in new growth.
"Perhaps, we need to be a little more rational, a little less exuberant." "The truth
is that the overall value chain can be quite profitable, but that individual parts can be
highly value-destroying This may be due partly to the fact that they were hidden in the
middle of individual company's value chain. It remains a seductive and dangerous trap
to those who invest in new capacity based on aspirations - rather than firm orders."
- Some statements that describe the industry
The misperception of Moore's Law will possibly result in profit erosion as well as
a mismatch of the supply and demand.
4.1.4 Product and Technology Transitions
The product and technology transitions are very common in an industry that has
fast clockspeed. In the semiconductor industry, three types of transitions dominate
the field: product transition, node (feature size) transition and wafer size transition.
Referring to the law of clockspeed, the product life cycle is the shortest (usually less
than one year); each process technology can support one or two products; the wafer
size takes more than ten years to escalate to the next level. Speedy introduction of
new products, combined with continuous process innovations, have made companies
vulnerable to the loss of market share and dysfunctional operations that may cause
bullwhip effect, thus highlighting the criticality of product and technology transition
management in gaining core competency.
Managing product and technology transitions is a risky and challenging task.
Those transitions are subject to market risk and technology risk [10]. As new products
are introduced, they are sold together with the old generations. The overlapping
period of product life cycle is the hardest time to plan demand forecast and production
accurately. In July 2001 after Intel released Pentium 4 processor, the sales of P4
chips didn't reach the expectation. However, the P3 processor sales didn't decline.
Instead, it grew faster in the 2nd quarter of 2001 [10]. Market risk indicates the
uncertainty of perceived value and quantity of new product by customers as well as
the consumption of the outgoing products. Failure to manage the product relay under
demand uncertainty will cause undesirable cost of extra capacity and inventory, even
the lag of market leadership. IBM PC has a case in point. In 1984, IBM introduced the
PC Junior as the successor of IBM PC. It piled up inventory prior to the introduction,
in the hope of grabbing adequate sales. Nevertheless, the sales of PC Junior plunged
due to technical problems. The high inventory level coupled with low diffusion rate
killed IBM PC Junior in 1995 [4].
The technology risk comes from ROI prospect, fab capacity utilization and sup-
plier's collaboration associated with the node and wafer size transitions. Since the
investment in process technology is immense, a high return over investment is what
all chip and tool makers expect to see, but the cost reduction benefited from the new
technology always remains controversial, particularly doubted by suppliers. Also,
pushing new technology while suspending the refinement of the old process risks los-
ing the economy of scale and learning effect. In addition, lack of skilled engineers
and poor coordination with suppliers during the transition period will lead to low
utilization, slow ramp-up and long lead time of tools, which sabotage the ability of
agile responsiveness to the market signals. Consider, the wafer size transition from
100-150mm was led by Intel in 1983; the transition to 200mm was initiated by IBM
in 1993 [33].
"When making the realistic comparison of new 200mm fab to a 150 mm factory
upgraded to meet new technology requirement, no die cost improvement was achieved
Both transitions [Intel and IBM] were unpleasant experiences for the lead company in
that it had to bear the burden of development costs manufacturing delays, and poor
equipment performance, all at little or no cost benefit."
- Daniel Seligson, Intel TME
The 300mm wafer size transition is also impregnated with the moan from equip-
ment suppliers of low cost benefit and bad coordination. The 450mm transition,
though in the agenda of the "big three" chip companies, receives tremendous resis-
tances from the supplier world.
4.2 Countermeasures of the Supply-Demand Mis-
match
In the preceding section, we have defined four main causes that contribute to the
strong bullwhip effect in the semiconductor industry. We believe that the essence of
this effect is mismatch of the supply and demand. The reasons described in Lee et al.
don't necessarily capture the real symptom of the profound volatility. Its root causes
lie in the villains of long lead time, fast clockspeed, misleading Moore's law and risky
transition management. Understanding the nature of this industry phenomenon is the
first step for the decision makers to conceive strategies to counteract it. Examining
their in-house operation and supply chain alignment is the next. In fact, a number of
successful practices and initiatives present various enlightening ideas for the industry
to learn and replicate. We will use those examples to discuss possible scenarios to
mitigate the imbalanced supply and demand.
4.2.1 Reduce the Lead Time
As discussed before, long fab construction time and equipment lead time create ex-
aggerated demand forecast and inaccurate capacity allocation. Moreover, the low
commit rate of equipment order causes fair amount of delay, making the situation
even worse. Increasing requests for high level of responsiveness by customers, in sharp
contrast to the long planning time and forecast horizon, have forced the chip com-
panies to streamline the production and improve the forecast credibility. Reducing
the lead time occurring at every node will directly relieve the problem. By fostering
the well-known Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR) ini-
tiative, companies could enjoy not only lead time reduction, but also better forecast
accuracy and more flexible capacity allocation through joint efforts with supplies. For
instance, big retailers like Wal-mart, Sears and Best Buy, together with the suppli-
ers including P&G and Kimberly-Clark, have reported substantial improvement from
the CPFR project [40]. In the semiconductor field, STMicroeletronics, the Swiss chip
manufacturer, has set a good example of such efforts [31]. Historically, ST managed
the capacity planning manually: communicating with its suppliers via email and fax,
and transmitting the demand forecast by typing manually into ST's system. It took
days to send and receive and several weeks to fulfill a planning cycle. Realizing the
inefficiency, ST decided to carry out the "eCho" project in 2000, a new system that
enabled the collaborative forecast and replenishment through fast and synchronized
data exchange between ST and its suppliers. With its help, ST was able to share
forecast and schedule replenishment on a daily basis, largely facilitating the trans-
action and planning process. Over three year's practice, ST completely eliminated
the week-long forecast generation time, reduce the total planning and production
lead time by 50% (eight to four weeks) and increase the capacity utilization by 30%
thanks to more reliable demand forecast. ST's success has been built on the speedy
information sharing and flexible capacity planning. A more ambitious and renowned
illustration is Cisco's e-Hub project, which gets multiple ties of suppliers involved by
Internet and uses intelligent planning software to transmit data and report actions
promptly [18].
An alternative strategy to tackle the long planning cycle and uncertain demand is
to create buffer capacity. Rather than building extra capacity, utilizing the existing
capacity in an integrated way will offer the advantage of flexibility. TSMC used
a deliberate strategy named "clustering", locating six fabs at Hsinchu Science-based
Industrial Park together. The fab cluster allowed TSMC to overview the total capacity
as a whole and share resources across fabs. In effect, any capacity shortage and tool
maintenance problem in one fab could be complemented by another. TSMC was able
to reach capacity utilization of almost 100 percent of the installed based consistently
[36].
4.2.2 Adapt to the Clockspeed
We have seen the acceleration of clockspeed started from the technology source to the
customer application. Failure to adapt to the unprecedented clockspeed will make
companies' operation and product planning out of line with the dynamic market. The
fast clockspeed will turn the industry into a chaotic mess if the roadmaps that each
individual firm refers to are all different. Therefore, it can be very helpful to found
industry alliances to get every member adapt to the clockspeed and march at the
same pace. Based on this purpose, the semiconductor industry association Sematech
was established to align the interests and devise technological solutions among various
members. It organized both the chip maker's alliance - Sematech and tool maker's
alliance - SEMI-Sematch, aiming at developing roadmap consensus to coordinate the
technology direction and optimize the performance of demand fulfillment in this fast
clockspeed industry [14] .
As we illustrated, fast clockspeed is often translated into unrealistic expectations,
which result in forward-buying when product is hot and ration gaming when short-
age occurs. To mitigate this overreaction, a stronger supplier-buyer tie is necessary.
Supplier's active participation in customer's forecast updates and inventory planning
can neutralize the distorted purchase behavior and provide more transparent infor-
mation of supplier's capacity. By granting suppliers the access to the demand data
and inventory level, the buyer reaps more responsive delivery rate and better visi-
bility of supplier's state. In consumer product industry, this approach is also known
as the vendor-managed inventory (VMI), favored by many agility-focused companies.
Apple Computer established a supplier hub that was operated by a 3PL company,
Fritz Companies. Fritz managed the inbound logistics of components in a hub that
located in close proximity to Apple factory. The inventory at the hub is managed
by all the suppliers [26]. The jointly effort between Fritz, Apple and its suppliers
significantly improved the efficiency of Apple's logistics and the ability of managing
its rapid product rollover.
4.2.3 Rationalize the Moore's Law
Moore's law implies two remarkable trends: continuous transistor scale down and cost
reduction. The impact of these trends is so strong that it tends to mislead the industry
to follow these trends aggressively, as the only way to capture the demand growth.
After a careful reasoning, putting more transistors into chips makes sense only if they
are acceptable by the market. Previously, we have drawn a comparison between 4GB
DRAM and NANO memory to demonstrate that the real trigger of chip demand lies
in the emerging requirement in the application end. Regarding the continuation of
cost reduction, we have also seen that it contributed to nothing but price reduction
and margin loss in the DRAM, NOR as well as Logic IDM segments. One might argue
that in the context of demand elasticity, price reduction can subsequently spur extra
growth of demand. However, as Figure 4-3 [15] shows, the revenue flatted during
1985-2000 and 1995-2000, the same time when price droped rapidly. On the contrary,
the revenue surged during 1990-1995 and 2000-2005 when price stayed still. This
evidence denies the relationship between demand stimulation and fast price decline.
In fact, it is the end customers that ultimately benefit from the price decline. Their
increasing dollar demand for more chips is offset by the low price, whereas their
spending goes up when the price flats.
By rationalizing Moore's Law, we know that being the leader. of cost and transistor
scale doesn't necessarily salvage the "profitless prosperity". When looking at the other
end of spectrum, fabless and foundry firms both make a strong operating profitability
[30]. That sheds some light on the redirection of the non-fabless business model -
towards the provision of more value-added services. With high service level, firms are
able to charge premium prices, achieve better profitability and capture extra market
share. Here we introduce the success stories of two service-oriented companies. The
first one is TSMC [36], the world largest foundry firm, who named itself "a service
company." Specifically, it offered customers high degree of flexibility to change the
volume, recipe and ship dates; maintained in-house libraries for its customer to get
direct access to the leading edge process technology; bore cost to validated IPs to
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ensure its customer had the variety of IP cores to choose from. The most special one
is TSMC's Cyber-Shuttle program. Usually customer had to bear the heavy expense
of masks, which had to be remade with every design revision in the prototyping stage.
TSMC owned one of the world's largest mask making facility and came up with
the solution that multiple customers can share the same set of mask using multiple
modules wafers. Customer can refine their designs without reinvesting in the whole
set of masks. The second story is Xilinx Inc., a fabless company specialized in field-
programmable logic [26]. Due to the frequent product updates, Xilinx chips require
constant functionality reconfiguration. Xilinx created the Internet Reconfigurable
Logic, which empowered its users to modify and upgrade the chips at great ease.
4.2.4 Mitigate the Transition Risk
The key to managing the transition is to mitigate the market risks arising from new
production introduction and the technology risks arise from new technology adop-
tion. Intel Corp., the giant leading chip maker, presents many sparkling transition
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management strategies for the other market players to absorb its experiences.
Intel's approach to tackle the market risk is the pricing of the overlapping prod-
ucts. Intel usually stabilizes the initial price of a new product and gradually reduces
the price as the product gets matured to steadily increase its market value. Once new
product rolls out, Intel sells off the old product at a low price according to its market
value. In this manner, Intel is able to truncate the product overlapping period and
focus more attention on the new product penetration. This strategy is referred to
as the "wafer falling" in the industry [10]. Intel used this strategy to coordinate the
transition from DX-486 chips to Pentium chips. It cut the price of DX-486 aggres-
sively to clear its market presence and to simulate the adoption of Pentium chips [4].
"We're watched the same kind of relationship grow among suppliers as we're cre-
ated information repositories for fabrication equipment. When we develop a new
technology, we work for years and years with both our customers and our suppliers
before the technology is available, so products exist that use the technology then it's
ready to ship. "
- Sandra Morris, vice president and chief information officer of Intel
Harvard Business Review, 2003
One of Intel's strategies to mitigate the technology risk is through getting its
partners constantly involved in the development of new technology. Building such an
interactive supply chain relationship not only eliminates the uncertainty and mistrust
from its supply chain partners but also aligns the interests and incentives to promote
the new technology as a whole. In addition, Intel has implemented a delicate "Tick-
Tock" model to manage the orchestration of process technology and product genera-
tion on a two-year cadence [211. During year one (tick), Intel develops a new process
technology (e.g. 45nm) to scale up chip density and improve the performance and
efficiency of the old processor (e.g. Intel Core). During year two (tick), Intel delivers
a new processor generation (e.g. Nehalem) and optimize the value of the updated
process technology. The Tick-Tock model elegantly drives the pace of technology in-
novations in a reliable and modularized schedule, reducing the complexity of process
and product convolution. Fine has described a comparable practice of Intel as a bril-
liant implementation of Three Dimension Concurrent Engineering (3-DCE)strategy
[14].
4.3 Summary
The supply-demand mismatch problem in semiconductor industry is more pronounced
than other industries. We classified the causes of the problem into the long lead time,
fast industry clockspeed, misleading Moore's law and frequent transitions. Then we
presented a careful diagnose of these symptoms and provide some managerial implica-
tions for the managers to counteract the four enemies. We concluded that, externally,
sharing forecast collaboratively with suppliers, VMI model and working closely with
venders and vendees to deliver new products are instrumental in mitigating the mag-
nitude of order distortion. Internally, creating flexible capacity, retargeting service
level as well as designing stable and modularized transition strategy benefit compa-
nies the agility to tackle the uncertainty and the competitives advantages in setting
leadership examples. Many motivating industry practices, such as Apple's supplier
hub, TSMC's cyber-shuttle and Intel's Tick-Tock model, serve as credible supporting
evidences.
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